Journal of Transportation Management
Volume 15 | Issue 1

Article 7

4-1-2004

Depot repair capacity as a criterion for
transportation mode selection in the retrograde
movement of reparable assets
William A. Cunningham
Air Force Institute of Technology

Stephen Swartz
Air Force Institute of Technology

Harold M. Kahler
Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command USAF

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jotm
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Transportation
Commons
Recommended Citation
Cunningham, William A., Swartz, Stephen & Kahler, Harold M. (2004). Depot repair capacity as a criterion for transportation mode
selection in the retrograde movement of reparable assets. Journal of Transportation Management, 15(1), 55-66. doi: 10.22237/jotm/
1080777960

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Transportation Management by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

DEPOT REPAIR CAPACITY AS A
CRITERION FOR TRANSPORTATION
MODE SELECTION IN THE RETROGRADE
MOVEMENT OF REPARABLE ASSETS
William A. Cunningham
Air Force Institute of Technology
Stephen Swartz
Air Force Institute of Technology
Harold M. Kahler
Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command USAF

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Government.

ABSTRACT
To support smaller reparable asset inventories, current Air Force logistics policies direct the
“expedited evacuation of reparables ... to the source of repair.” Mode selection is based on the
asset. Focusing on the asset is an efficient and effective method of getting assets to where
they are needed in a timely manner in the forward portion of the supply pipeline. However,
in the reverse portion of the pipeline, the demand for an asset may no longer be critical to how
it is transported. The quantity of the asset at the depot may already exceed repair capacity.
In this instance, rapid movement results in the asset being added to the backlog already
awaiting repair, thus retrograde modal selection focus should shift to repair capacity. Since
the depots face budget and manning constraints and do not operate on a continuous basis,
their repair capacity is limited. With finite repair resources, the question of when an asset
can be repaired should be involved in mode determination. A stock-point modeling approach
was used, with depot production requirements as a surrogate for demand in calculating
shipping priority. Using Warner Robins Air Logistics Center reparable asset production data,
this article illustrates potential savings in transportation that are possible utilizing an
alternative factor in modal choice decision for the retrograde or reverse portion of the pipeline.
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INTRODUCTION
Air Force guidance on management and direction
of the reparable item pipeline is primarily found
in AFPD 20-3, Air Force Weapon System Repar
able Asset Management (Department of the Air
Force, 1998) and the Air Force instruction which
implements this policy directive, AFI 21-129,
Two Level Maintenance and Regional Repair of
Air Force Weapon Systems and Equipment
(Department of the Air Force, 1998). This
guidance provides the scope of the reverse
pipeline which,
begins when a weapons system reparable
asset is removed from an end item,
repaired or declared as NRTS (Not
Repairable This Station) and concludes
when the item has returned to the
serviceable inventory (Department of the
Air Force, 1998, p. 3).
This is a slightly expanded viewr of reverse
logistics than is normally discussed, which ends
when the item is returned to its point of origin.
In AFPD 20-3, the Air Force expands the scope of
retrograde logistics to include the repositioning
of a newly-repaired asset. This guidance provides
the basis for the reparable pipeline:
The objective of Air Force logistics is to
maximize operational capability by using
high velocity, time definite processes to
manage mission and logistics uncertainty
in lieu of large inventory levels—
resulting in shorter cycle times, reduced
inventories and cost, and a smaller mobil
ity footprint (Department of the Air
Force, 1998, p. 1).

inventory to counter variability. An Air Force
Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) study
described the rationale for this policy:
Air Force supply policies are closely
linked to the use of premium transporta
tion. The logic for these policies is based
on the classic tradeoff between inventory
investment and transportation costs... Air
Force inventory policies are sensitive to
transportation or pipeline times because
inventory costs tend to be relatively high
and transportation costs low (Masciulli,
Boone, and Lyle, 2002, p. 2).
The Air Force’s transportation guidance, AFI 24201, Cargo Movement, also reinforces this notion:
Increased transportation costs are offset
by reduced inventory levels resulting in
overall logistics savings and mission
sustainment (Department of the Air
Force, 1999, p. 9).
Transportation Mode Selection
Reliance on transportation to support lower
inventory levels and faster cycle times places a
premium on transportation mode selection. Vari
ous authors have stated that the importance of
transportation mode selection lays in its impact
on a firm’s total logistics system (Stock and
Lambert, 2001; Coyle, Bardi, and Novak, 2000;
Liberatore and Miller, 1995; Sheffi, Eskandari,
and Koutsopoulos, 1988). But more than that, it
is the interaction and synergy between logistics
activities that drive costs. Stock and Lambert
state,

The policy directive goes on to direct the
“expedited evacuation of reparables by bases... to
the source of repair” (Department of the Air
Force, 1998, p. 1).

Effective management and real cost
savings can be accomplished only by
viewing logistics as an integrated system
and minimizing its total cost given the
firm’s customer service level (2001, p. 28).

The most significant aspect of this guidance is
that the Air Force pipeline is transportationbased. Air Force logistics relies on a time definite
and expedited means of transportation instead of

The customer service level provided by a mode of
transportation is the preeminent factor involved
in mode choice. This is not to say that the goal is
the highest level of service available. It is the
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optimal level of service that is desired, once
other trade-offs have been considered. Stock and
Lalonde, in a pre-deregulation study, found that
service related variables, such as reliability,
loss/damage, and total transit time, were most
important (Stock and Lalonde, 1977, p. 57). For
pre-deregulation this would have to be true,
since price was not allowed to be utilized as a
competitive weapon.
Other studies (McGinnis, 1990; Murphy and
Hall, 1995) have shown this to be true after
deregulation. Confirming this and broadening
the scope to post-deregulation, McGinnis found
that,
While
post-deregulation
literature
suggests that shippers have placed
greater emphasis on costs since 1980,
shipper priorities have not changed
fundamentally... (McGinnis, 1990, p. 17).
Murphy and Hill (1995), in their analysis using
studies published in the early 1990’s demon
strated that customer service was still the
preeminent factor. However, costs have grown in
importance during post-deregulation:
Shippers in the U.S. value reliability
more highly than cost and other service
variables in the freight transportation
choice process... (Murphy and Hill, 1995,
P- 37).

The goal in modal choice decisions is to use the
lowest cost transportation consistent with a given
service level. The overwhelming driver of mode
choice cited was customer service first, followed
by an optimization of costs (Giese, 1995; Rautenberg, 1995; Coyle, et al, 2001; Stock and
Lambert, 2001). However, costs must be con
sidered. Quite a few authors make this point:
Freight rates are an important variable
that should not be ignored... (McGinnis,
1990, p. 17).
Economic and resource constraints man
date that organizations make the most

efficient and productive mode and carrier
choice decisions possible (Stock and
Lambert, 2001, p. 355).
When costs are considered, freight cost should
not be analyzed in isolation. Coyle, Bardi, and
Novak (2001) note that failure to consider the
total picture is hazardous. Simply selecting a low
cost mode, while lowering transportation costs,
may raise inventory or warehousing costs, and
reduce customer service.
Air Force Transportation Mode Selection
The Air Force logistics system is transportationbased and relies on a time definite and expedited
means of transportation instead of inventory to
counter variability. This places a premium on
effective mode selection. The applicable trans
portation guidance in this area is found in three
publications. The first is the Defense Transporta
tion Regulation (DTR), Part 2 (Department of
Defense, 2000). This document sets time stan
dards and allows for expedited movement of
cargo w hen needed. Second, AFI 24-201, Cargo
Movement (Department of the Air Force, 1999),
is the overarching Air Force transportation regu
lation. Finally, Air Mobility Command Freight
Traffic Rules, Publication Number 5 (AMC,
1999), applies DoD transportation rules to all
carriers hauling freight for the DoD. These three
regulations cover the span of the movement of
freight within the DoD and the Air Force. In
addition to the transportation guidance, AFI 21129, Two-level Maintenance and Regional Repair
of Air Force Weapons Systems and Equipment
(Department of the Air Force, 1998) states the
following:
Traffic managers must ensure that
reparable 2LM [two-level maintenance]
items are evacuated as quickly as
possible for shipment to repair activities.
Shipment planners must make every
effort to ship those assets the same day
they are received from Supply or Main
tenance organizations (Department of the
Air Force, 1998, p. 11).
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From the guidance on reparable maintenance,
instructions require that the NRTS asset be
transported off base as quickly as possible.
Further, regulations state that the reparable
assets should be “moved using fast, time-definite
best value transportation...” (Department of the
Air Force, 1998, p. 11).
However, as one study of Air Force shipping
policies states, “the definitive word comes from
AFI 24-201” (Masciulli and Cunningham, 2001,
p. 4). This transportation instruction provides
Ar Force transportation managers with the
direct guidance on selecting the mode of trans
portation for a NRTS asset. Chapter 2 of AFI
24-201 provides the concept of operations for
transportation managers.
According to this document, all reparable items
will be shipped using commercial express.
Explicitly, the directive states:
Commercial air express small-package
delivery service... is the norm for Agile
Logistics/2LM/Rapid Parts Movement
shipments to meet Air Force sustainment
goals (Department of the Ar Force, 1999,
p. 9-10).
It also sets a rigorous and compressed time
standard of 24 hours from the time an item is
declared NRTS by maintenance until it is pro
cessed through supply to transportation and
picked up by the carrier (Department of the Ar
Force, 1999, p. 10). AFI 24-201 also states that
the DoD is a mandatory user of the General Ser
vices Administration small package express
program. In other words, any item shipped by
the DoD (and thus the Air Force), must be sent
by express air. The exceptions to this are
provided in paragraphs 6.1.1 through 6.1.5 of the
instruction (Department of the Ar Force, 1999,
p. 22). Three of the major exceptions include
distances under 500 miles, contingency opera
tions, and shipments over 151 pounds.
The overall Ar Force policy on transportation
mode selection (for forward or retrograde
movement of assets) is a fast, time-definite,
58
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traceable means. Mode is not dictated (see also
Kossow, 2003; Masciulli, et al., 2002; and Mas
ciulli and Cunningham, 2001). However, as is
seen in AFI 24-201, it may be specified in certain
instances. For example, an individual shipment
under 151 pounds and over 500 miles distant
from origin will be sent via express air under the
terms of the GSA small package express
contract.
Masciulli and Cunningham (2001) analyzed Air
Force Mission Capable (MICAP) part shipping
policies and examined MICAP shipment data.
They found that current Ar Force shipping poli
cies are less than optimal from a cost standpoint
(Masciulli and Cunningham, 2001, p. 4). Of par
ticular interest is the heavy reliance on the use
of premium, overnight air to ship items. The
data used in this study had several examples of
misuse of premium, overnight air, including a
shipment that traveled a total of 11.4 miles.
They raised the following question regarding this
issue:
...is the use of FedEx so ingrained in the
Ar Force and DoD corporate culture
[that] it is automatically ... used as the
carrier for MICAP items and other timecritical shipments without regard to cost,
distance or other factors? (Masciulli and
Cunningham, 2001, p. 7)
The problem with the current Air Force policies
is that they seek to optimize the entire logistics
pipeline by optimizing each individual segment
in terms of transportation times. The reasoning
is, if the part is shipped by the fastest mode in
each segment, this will result in the fastest
overall order cycle time. However, this view
ignores the effects of bottlenecks in one segment
that might affect other decisions in that segment
or other segments, and is the antithesis of the
systems approach to logistics management.
Current Air Force reparable asset management
policy calls for the expedited movement of
reparables,
...using high velocity, time definite
processes to manage mission and logistics

uncertainty in lieu of large inventory
levels... (Department of the Air Force,
1998, p. 1).
In addition, Air Force transportation policy,
while not dictating mode, further calls for the
fast movement of reparable items (Department
of the Air Force, 1999). This policy may focus
inappropriately on the asset, rather than being
contingent upon what is happening at the repair
depot. The quantity of the asset at the depot may
already exceed the depot repair capacity. In this
instance, the rapid movement of an asset to the
depot would result in the asset arriving and
being added to the backlog of items awaiting
repair. This would be an inefficient use of
transportation resources.
ANALYSIS
This article examines the use of depot capacity
as a determinant of retrograde mode selection.
No previous studies were found that incorpor
ated the use of receiver capacity to process (by
repairing or otherwise modifying) the item
shipped as a determinant in mode selection. In
this study, the required transportation service
level will be determined by what is occurring at
the depot. The quantity of assets at the depot
and the depot repair capacity are used to
determine what service level is required and,
where this level could be provided by a lower cost
mode, potential cost savings are calculated.
Supply Data
The supply data were obtained from the depot
wholesale and retail receiving and shipping data
base. The data include two measurements per
month from January to July 2002. The depot
pipeline data needed from these measurements
are the quantities of each national shipping
number (NSN) that are in the depot pipeline and
are physically at the depot.
Also needed is depot capacity. However, depot
capacity data could not be obtained from the air
logistics centers (ALC). The Oklahoma City ALC

responded to a request for capacity data with the
following:
As we operate today, capacity is a very,
very rough cut determination ... capacity
requirements planning at the rough cut
level may indicate sufficient capacity
exists to execute a master production
schedule only to find at the micro level
(close to or at the time of production) that
capacity is insufficient ... there are too
many variables surrounding the determi
nation of shop capacity to make any kind
of reliable statement concerning the mode
of shipment based on capacity data
(Oklahoma City, ALC, 2004).
The other depots confirmed this, describing shop
capacity as a “floating” or “running” figure based
upon budget, manning, and equipment. There
fore, a surrogate measure for depot capacity was
developed.
Depot Capacity and Induction
Requirements
In order to determine the shipment priority of a
reparable item back to the depot repair station,
the time sensitivity of the shipment must be
established. The repair schedule, a combination
of depot capacity and funded repair authoriza
tions, determines the monthly requirement for
the numbers of items to be inducted for repair. A
stock point model approach was used to deter
mine time sensitivity. The sensitivity is based
upon shipping mode selection in order to prevent
“stocking out” of items for induction.
The stock point model approach is based upon
maintaining sufficient stocks of an item of inven
tory in order to ensure an acceptable level of risk
of having insufficient inventory to meet demand. In
this application, demand is the need for repar
able assets to induct for a given production cycle.
If the number of such items at the beginning of
a production period is already sufficient to meet
all of the induction needs for that period, then no
shipment is required. If there are insufficient

Spring 2004

59

items to meet the production need, then
shipments must be scheduled in order to provide
items ahead of need in order to assume a limited
risk of stocking out.

alternate transportation mode is needed to
evaluate the effectiveness of mode selection.

In this research, the induction needs of the depot
repair shop were treated as the “customer
demands” for the stock point model. Actual depot
capacity sets an upper bound for the number of
items that could be repaired in any monthly
period. While the lower bound for any period is
zero, the funded allocation of repairs per month
over the annual budget cycle would set a
practical average level of induction in any period.
While information on actual depot capacity (up
per bound) was not available, actual production
counts (demands) were available from historical
records.

Since only Warner Robins ALC provided produc
tion data, the pool of NSN’s is limited to those
for which this center is either the source of
repair (SOR) or source of supply (SOS). To en
sure 30 or more observations, only those NSN’s
that were in all three years of the monthly
production data were used. These NSN’s serve as
a filter for the transportation data. NSN’s having
fewer than two shipments (air or ground) were
also excluded. Of the NSN’s remaining, only
those with eleven or more shipments were used
in this study.

Depot production data were acquired from
Warner Robins ALC. Actual monthly production
quantities of national shipping numbers (NSN’s)
produced by repair shops at Warner Robins from
October 2000 to December 2003 (less missing
data for April 2002) for approximately 5,500
NSN’s were obtained from historical records.
Using Microsoft Access, these files were joined
together to yield a sample of NSN’s with non
zero production counts in each month. Descrip
tive statistics were calculated for these items to
compare against depot stock. While all data
samples did not strictly adhere to a theoretical
normal distribution, the data were sufficiently
symmetrical and mound-shaped, and the
samples large enough, to apply the central limit
theorem. Under the application of the stock point
modeling technique, this data represented
“customer demand” for the purpose of calculating
risk of stockout and time sensitivity of resupply.
Transportation Data
Transportation data came from Headquarters,
Air Force Materiel Command’s Logistic Support
Office (LSO), and the D087T, “Tracker” data
base. The transportation data required consisted
of the trip information and cost data. In addition
to actual transportation data, information on an
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Methodology

Once the sample was obtained, the methodology
became fairly simple in nature. The intent was to
evaluate the efficacy of the modal choice made.
Throughout the analysis, it involved comparing
the depot stock (consisting of condition code F
reparable items in depot supply and those in
transit to the depot repair shop from depot
supply) with the depot production averages
calculated from the Warner Robins ALC produc
tion data. For this model, if the depot stock is
greater than the average monthly production,
plus three standard deviations for a given repar
able asset, the asset can be sent by the least cost
method. This test was performed on all 3,189
NSN’s. Because 14 different production data files
were available, each NSN was evaluated for
efficiency of modal selection 14 times.
The use of + 3(7 was decided upon because 99.7
percent of all measurements fall within three
standard deviations of the mean. Since, for the
purposes of this study, only the right tail of the
distribution is relevant, 99.85 percent (virtually
all occurrences) of the time the depot repair shop
production rate will be less than (! + 3O.
The final step is to calculate a potential savings
figure using an alternate mode (in this study
FedEx ground shipments) for shipments that
passed the above mentioned test (fi + 3(7). Of the

NSN’s remaining after the paring is accom
plished, a random sample of 35 NSN’s were se
lected to calculate this cost saving. In Microsoft
Access, the results of the modal tests and the
transportation data were linked in a query that
filtered for shipments of the 35 randomly
selected NSN’s and for the given date of the
production data file, then screened out those that
failed the test.
A significant number of transportation records
were missing the actual cost data. Due to this
fact, the 2004 FedEx government domestic
express rate for standard overnight shipments
was used for the cost of the shipments. The 2004
FedEx government rates for two and three day
rates and the FedEx standard commercial
ground shipment rates were used to calculate the
savings gained by going with a slower mode, and
the percentage saved over standard overnight
rates was also calculated. The difference in cost
between the mode used and the alternate mode,
multiplied by the number that could be shipped
using a least cost approach, gives the total
potential savings. In order to ascertain what
these savings might constitute when projected
over the entire set of repaired NSN’s, the savings
from the random sample to the population were
extrapolated.
Transportation Mode Evaluation
Once the sample was obtained, the ability to ship
via a slower or lower cost mode was evaluated.
The depot stock figure, consisting of the sum of
condition code F items in depot supply, and those
in transit from depot supply to the repair shop,
was calculated for all 3,189 NSN’s for all 14 of
the production data files and compared with the
average monthly production, plus three standard
deviations. Table 1 displays the results of this
comparison by sample size.
Potential Sav ings
After obtaining the results of the modal evalua
tion analysis, the data were filtered for those
shipments on the dates of the production data
files from the 35 NSN’s whose depot stock

allowed for slower transportation. A total of 34 of
the 35 sample NSN’s had at least one occasion of
depot stock exceeding the production rate. These
NSN’s had a total of 114 shipments on the dates
of the 14 data files. The calculation of savings is
provided in Table 2.
Calculating what that savings might constitute
when extrapolated over the entire set of re
paired NSN’s was accomplished by assuming
that the savings of a larger sample is propor
tional to the relative sizes of the two samples.
Table 3 shows the results of this extrapolation.
Recall that this figure is only for 14 days,
assuming the ratios hold throughout. Annual
savings would be derived by dividing the savings
figure by the ratio of 14/250 (assuming no
shipments on weekends or federal holidays).
Annualized extrapolation would yield savings of
$102,055,053.87 for all NSN’s and $38,771,413.33
for those managed by Warner Robins ALC. A
simple “back of the napkin” sensitivity analysis

Table 1
Results of Modal Evaluation
Sample
35
213
593
3,189

Trials
490
2,982
8,302
44,646

Success
410
2,585
6,283
24,189

%
83.7
86.7
75.7
54.2

TABLE 2
SAVINGS FROM ALTERNATIVE MODE
Cost
Standard
Overnight
(SO)
2 day
3 day
Ground

Savings

% of SO

375.6
506.08
1,497.91

14.57%
19.63%
58.10%

2,577.96
2,202.36
2,071.88
1,080.05
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TABLE 3
EXTRAPOLATION OF SAVINGS

Total Repair NSN’s
WR ALC NSN’s
NSN’s with Production Data
NSN’s with Activity
213 >11 ships
Random Sample

Sample Size
133,538
50,732
3,189
593
213
35

Ratio
0.380
0.063
0.186
0.359
0.164

Savings ($)
5,715,083.02
2,171,199.15
136,481.00
25,378.88
9,115.85
1,497.91

*This assumes the ratios hold throughout

illustrates that, even if the results of the inter
polation were off by 90 percent, substantial sav
ings would result from a modal selection process
that utilized depot capacity and on-hand inven
tory as decision criteria.
RESULTS
This research addressed the basis for Air Force
transportation mode selection in the retrograde
movement of reparable assets. Air Force inven
tory policy is transportation-based, offsetting the
increased transportation costs with lower
inventory expenses. Overall policy directs ship
ment by a fast, time-definite and traceable
means. While in general mode is not directed, in
the review of Air Force policy, it was shown that
certain supply and transportation policies, such
as Agile Logistics, Two-Level Maintenance and
Rapid Parts Movement required fast movement
of reparable items in those categories. According
to one study of this process, most often this
means that an NRTS asset is shipped via pre
mium air transportation (Masciulli, Boone, and
Lyle, 2002).
The literature review has shown the focus of Ar
Force modal selection to be on the asset, its type
and the current demand for it. While these are
important in mode selection, in the reverse
portion of the logistics pipeline, using these to
determine the shipment mode omits a critical
factor affecting this decision. This factor is the
62
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limited or finite repair capacity at repair depots.
The fact that there is a finite repair capacity
should be the major determinant in how an asset
is shipped. Otherwise, if the depot has a suffi
cient quantity to work on (for this study a one
month supply was considered sufficient), after
express shipping the asset to the depot, it will
just sit and await repair. This produces a
situation analogous to our military’s notorious
penchant for “hurry up and wait.” In addition,
this also results in the over-expenditure of a
significant amount of resources for premium air
when a slower, cheaper mode would have suf
ficed.
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Transportation Command’s Strategic
Distribution program guidance states,
Improved retrograde of valuable, repair
able stock to service maintenance depots,
synchronized with depot repair schedules,
has enormous potential in areas of readi
ness, reduced inventories, and long-term
cost savings (USTRANSCOM, 2003, p. 15).
While reverse logistics and synchronization may
not seem directly germane to transportation
mode selection, it is essential that mode selection
not be made in a vacuum. The entire system
must be considered. As Stock and Lambert put
it,

effective management and real cost
savings can be accomplished only by
viewing logistics as an integrated system
and minimizing its total cost given the
firm’s customer service level (2001, p. 29).
Part of this systemic view entails taking into
account what is happening upstream at the
source of supply and repair. This research
queried whether depot repair capacity should be
a factor in retrograde transportation mode selec
tion. The results make the answer to this
question an emphatic yes. The high percentage
of “passes” (incidences of depot stock being
greater than depot production) indicates that the
depot has more than enough to wrork on. For
these items, shipment by premium air (standard
overnight service) will not result in efficient
induction, repair and return to using bases.
Rather it will mean their addition to the assets
already awaiting induction for repair.
Implicit in Air Force reliance on fast transporta
tion to offset smaller inventories is that this
tradeoff has to be made. It should follow that the
depot should be dependent upon fast shipment to
maintain production. While this methodology
presented depot stock as being greater than pro
duction rate as a “pass” or “success,” it actually
represents a failure of the logistics system to
successfully make the tradeoff between inventory
and transportation. In those instances, a part was
either sent too fast or a point where the Air
Force possessed too much inventory was ldenti-
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